This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productivity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The existence of competitive equilibrium is proven and a recursive characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any competitive equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent competitive equilibrium that is generated by a suitably defined recursive equilibrium.
Introduction
It has been documented by a number of empirical studies that the standard representative agent (or complete markets) model fails to explain many phenomena observed in the data. This leads to interest in models with heterogeneity and incomplete markets. 1 One class of such models, called the Bewley-style model, has drawn special attention. A typical environment of this model is described in Krusell and Smith [24] . It features a continuum of consumers making consumption and savings decisions subject to borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic labor endowment shocks. There is only one asset (capital) serving as a buffer against individual shocks. Finally, a single firm makes production decisions with constant-returns-to-scale technology, subject to aggregate productivity shocks. 2 This paper addresses two central open questions. The first is the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium for this type of models. The second is whether there is a recursive characterization of sequential competitive equilibria. Krusell and Smith [24] and a number of later studies directly pose a recursive equilibrium formulation (henceforth, KS-recursive equilibrium) and then proceed with numerical solutions without studying its existence and the relation to sequential competitive equilibria. By contrast, I start with the analysis of sequential competitive equilibria, and then move on to recursive characterizations.
The key insight of this paper is to reformulate the Bewley-style model along the lines of Hildenbrand [18] and Hart et al. [15] . Specifically, I describe the dynamic economy using sequences of aggregate distributions over consumers' characteristics (individual asset holdings and the realization of endowment shocks) across the population. These sequences of aggregate distributions contain the relevant information for equilibrium analysis and they are the principal objects of study. In particular, given exogenous shocks, aggregate distributions fully determine prices and aggregate quantities such as aggregate capital. It turns out that this reformulation is the key to answering the preceding two questions.
To study the existence of sequential competitive equilibria, I begin with a detailed analysis of a typical individual's decision problem. After aggregating individual optimal behavior and deriving the law of motion for aggregate distributions, I establish the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium by applying the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff FixedPoint Theorem to a compact space of sequences of aggregate distributions (Theorem 1). This result is established under standard assumptions on preferences and technology and for fairly general individual and aggregate shock processes. For example, these are assumed to satisfy the Feller property, but they need not be stationary or Markovian. However, for technical reasons, I assume that the state space for aggregate shocks is countable.
After imposing the additional assumption that individual and aggregate shocks are timehomogenous Markov processes, I turn to recursive characterizations of sequential competitive equilibria. I define a notion of recursive equilibrium with the state variables consisting of individual asset holdings, the realization of individual shocks, the realization of aggregate shocks, the aggregate distribution, and payoffs (expected discounted utilities). Including the first three as state variables is standard. It is also natural to include the aggregate distribution as a state variable because with incomplete markets and heterogeneous consumers, equilibrium prices generally depend on the distribution of assets across consumers.
Including payoffs as a state variable to make certain decision problems recursive is a technique widely adopted in the literature on sequential games [5, 7, 11] and on dynamic contracts [1, 32, 36] . Here this state variable serves as a device for selecting continuation equilibria when the economy unfolds over time.
Theorem 2 demonstrates that given an initial state, the so defined recursive equilibrium generates a sequential competitive equilibrium. Theorem 3 demonstrates that a recursive equilibrium exists. Moreover, for any sequential competitive equilibrium, there is a payoff equivalent sequential competitive equilibrium that is generated by a recursive equilibrium with the state space including payoffs.
A natural but open question is whether there is a recursive equilibrium with a smaller state space, for example, the KS-recursive equilibrium that excludes expected payoffs as a state variable. For a related finitely many agents economy, Kubler and Schmedders [25, Theorem 2] establish the existence of such a recursive equilibrium under the strong condition that the competitive equilibrium is globally unique for all possible initial values. Although one can state a similar result for the economies studied here, this strong condition cannot be checked from primitives.
The above analysis must surmount two technical difficulties. First, there is a difficulty associated with the presence of aggregate shocks. When they are present, aggregate distributions are generally random measures that may be correlated with individual shocks. As pointed out by Bergin and Bernhardt [6] , this creates not only difficulties of tractability but also conceptual problems associated with the meaning of perfect competition. Thus, I follow Bergin and Bernhardt [6] and assume the conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition. This requires that, conditional on the history of aggregate shocks, the aggregate distribution at each date be a constant measure. Second, there are subtle technical problems, pointed out by Judd [20] , associated with an environment that has a continuum of agents, e.g., measurability and the law of large numbers. This paper deals with these problems in a manner similar to Feldman and Gilles [13] and Karatzas et al. [21] . 3 I now review the related literature. There is a growing literature on numerical analysis of Bewley-style models with aggregate shocks [14, 23, 24, 34] . None of these considers the theoretical issues studied here. My paper is also related to [4, 11] . There is also an extensive literature on sequential competitive equilibria for pure-exchange incomplete markets economies (e.g., [17, 27, 29, 30] ). All these papers consider a finite number of heterogeneous consumers. The traditional method of proving existence of sequential competitive equilibria is to take limits of equilibria in truncated economies in which trade stops at some finite date. This requires two conditions: First, the existence of sequential competitive equilibria for finite-horizon economies must be established. Second, the resulting sequence of equilibria for finite-horizon economies must converge to a limit under some suitable topology and this limit is the equilibrium of the original infinite-horizon economy. By contrast, this paper follows a direct proof strategy. Exploiting the special feature of the continuum agents environment, I reformulate the economy in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. The space of these sequences endowed with some topology is compact, and hence a topological fixed point theorem can be applied if a suitably defined map is continuous. A sequential competitive equilibrium is then delivered by a fixed point of this map. This proof method is much simpler than the traditional one.
In order to ensure compactness, I impose exogenously fixed borrowing constraints, instead of "nonbinding" endogenous borrowing constraints (that is, borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes but nothing else). This assumption is also adopted in [11] and the applied macroeconomics literature. My proof method does not apply to the case of nonbinding endogenous borrowing constraints. Moreover, the existence of continuous recursive equilibria may not be guaranteed if the exogenous borrowing constraints never bind. This is because under this condition Krebs [22] proves a nonexistence result for pure-exchange economies with finitely many agents. Whether or not a similar nonexistence result holds in the economy studied here is an open question.
The recursive characterization in this paper is different from Duffie et al. [11] who study finitely many agents economies. 4 The key idea of Duffie et al. [11] is to construct an expectations correspondence, which specifies, for each possible current state, the transitions that are consistent with feasibility and satisfy short-run equilibrium conditions. Typically, the expectations correspondence is constructed using the first-order conditions for all agents. This procedure seems invalid for the continuum agents economies since there is a continuum of first-order conditions. Moreover, my result does not require differentiability assumptions on utility functions, so first-order conditions are not available. My recursive characterization is achieved by first defining an equilibrium correspondence and a related correspondence, and then taking a measurable selection. An advantage of my recursive characterization is that the state space is smaller than that in [11] since the latter generally includes all endogenous variables, exogenous shocks, and signal variables as state variables.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium. Section 4 studies recursive characterizations of sequential competitive equilibria. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to an appendix.
The model
Consider an economy with a large number of infinitely lived consumers subject to individual endowment shocks and a single firm subject to aggregate productivity shocks. This economy is similar to that studied by Krusell and Smith [24] . Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Uncertainty is represented by a probability space ( × Z ∞ , F, P ) on which all stochastic processes are defined. The state space captures individual shocks, while the state space Z ∞ captures aggregate shocks. Let
∞ be the complete history and z 0 = z 0 ∈ Z 0 be a deterministic constant. 
Consumers
Consumers are distributed on the interval I = [0, 1] according to the Lebesgue measure . Consumers are ex ante identical in that they have the same preferences and their endowment shock processes are drawn from the same distribution. However, consumers are ex post heterogeneous in the sense that they experience idiosyncratic endowment shocks. 5 Information structure and endowments: Consumer i ∈ I is endowed with one unit of labor at each date t and a deterministic asset level a i 0 ∈ R ++ at the beginning of time 0. Labor endowment is subject to random shocks represented by a stochastic process (s i t ) t 0 valued in S ⊂ R + , where s i 0 is a deterministic constant. Let 
At the beginning of date t, consumer i observes his labor endowment shock s i t and the aggregate productivity shock z t . His information is represented by a -algebra F i t generated by past and current shocks {s i n , z n } t n=0 . 6 The following assumptions on the shock processes are maintained. 
where r t is the rental rate and w t is the wage rate. For simplicity, assume that all consumers cannot borrow so that:
Finally, let A = [0, ∞), and denote by A i the set of all asset accumulation plans of consumer i that satisfy the budget constraint (1) and the borrowing constraint (2). A consumption plan c ∈ C i corresponding to an asset accumulation plan a ∈ A i is called (budget) feasible.
Preferences: Consumer i's preferences are represented by an expected utility function defined on C i :
where ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and u : R + → R is the felicity function satisfying:
Assumption 3. The function u is bounded, continuous, and strictly concave.
Decision problem. Consumer i's problem is given by sup
The plans (c i t ) t 0 and (a i t+1 ) t 0 are optimal if the above supremum is achieved by
Allocation: An allocation ((c i t , a i t+1 ) t 0 ) i∈I is a collection of consumption and asset accumulation plans
This measurability requirement ensures certain integrals are well defined (see [10] for discussion of the difficulties that arise if it is violated). Since both c i t and a i t+1 are F i t -measurable for all fixed i ∈ I , they are also F t -measurable. Thus, the essential content of admissibility is that c i t and a i t+1 must be B(I )-measurable for each fixed ( , z t ) ∈ × Z t . To ensure that admissible allocations exist, I assume: 8
Assumption 4. For each t, s t
: I × × Z ∞ → S is B(I ) ⊗ F t -measurable.
The firm
There is a single firm renting capital at (net) rate r t and hiring labor at wage w t at date t. It produces output Y t with the constant-returns-to-scale technology F : R + × R + → R + :
where aggregate capital K t is F t−1 -measurable, aggregate labor N t is F t -measurable, and ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate. Capital is transformed from consumers' accumulated assets and aggregate labor supply N t is given exogenously.
F is homogeneous of degree one, strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable, and satisfies:
Remark 2.2. This assumption implies that there is a maximal sustainable capital stock K which is given by the unique solution to the equation zF (K, N) = K.
By Assumption 5, competitive profit maximization implies that for all t 0,
Note that prices r t and w t are F t -measurable.
Competitive equilibrium
I first define sequential competitive equilibrium in the standard way.
Definition 1. A sequential competitive equilibrium (((a i t+1 , c i t ) t 0 ) i∈I , (r t , w t ) t 0 ) consists of an admissible allocation ((a i
t+1 , c i t ) t 0 ) i∈I and price processes (r t , w t ) t 0 such that: (i) Given prices (w t , r t ) t 0 , (a i t+1 , c i t ) t 0 solves problem (3) for -a.e. i. (ii) Given prices (w t , r t ) t 0 , the firm maximizes profits so that (4) and (5) are satisfied for all t 0. (iii) Markets clear, i.e., for all t 0,
where
To analyze the existence and properties of sequential competitive equilibria, it is important to introduce the notion of aggregate distribution. Such a distribution is defined over the individual states across the population. An individual state is a pair of individual asset holdings and the history of individual shocks. More formally, if individual asset holdings and the shock history at date t 0 are a i t and s ti , respectively, i ∈ I , then the aggregate distribution, t ∈ P(A × S t ), is defined by
is the measure of consumers whose asset holdings and shock histories at date t lie in the set A × B. Note that t is a random measure since a i t = a i t ( , z t−1 ) and s i t = s i t ( , z t ) are random variables. Any aggregate variable can be written as an expectation with respect to the so defined aggregate distribution; for example,
The last equation follows from integration of Eq. (1). It implies the resource constraint (7) by the homogeneity of F and (4)- (5). Finally, Eqs. (4) and (5) induce pricing functions
From the above discussion, conclude that aggregate distributions contain all the relevant information for equilibrium analysis. Henceforth, they will be the focus of study.
Existence of competitive equilibrium
I begin by analyzing a single consumer's decision problem. I then discuss aggregation. I finally present the existence result. Notice that the model reduces to the case without aggregate shocks when Z contains only one element. Thus, all results to follow are valid for this case. 9 
The one-person decision problem
Consider a single consumer's decision problem, given a sequence of aggregate distributions = { t } t 0 . So the consumer index is suppressed.
In general, the aggregate distribution at date t is a measurable function of the individualrelevant state and the history of aggregate shocks z t (see (8) ). However, Section 3.2 will show that under some conditions, equilibrium aggregate distributions do not depend on the individual-relevant state . Therefore, this subsection assumes that the aggregate distribution t is a function from the set of histories of aggregate shocks Z t to P(A × S t ).
denote the set of such functions endowed with the product (or pointwise convergence) topology. Let
It is convenient to analyze an individual's consumption and savings decisions by dynamic programming. Let V t (a t , s t , z t , ) denote the maximized expected discounted utility of the consumer at date t, when his asset holdings are a t and the sequence of aggregate distributions is , given the individual shock history s t and the aggregate shock history z t . Then, at date t 0, the consumer solves the following dynamic programming problem:
The associated policy correspondence is defined by g t+1 :
s t , z t , ) ⊂ (a t , s t , z t , t (z t )). If g t+1 is single valued, it is called a policy function. If g t+1 (a t , s t , z t , )
is the set of maximizers of problem (11), it is called an optimal policy correspondence.
To understand problem (11), consider an n-period truncation. At date n, the consumer solves the following problem:
At date n − 1, by the principle of optimally, the consumer solves the following problem:
In general, at any date 0 t n, the consumer solves the problem: Problem (11) corresponds to the limiting case as n → ∞.
More formally, let V denote the set of uniformly bounded and continuous real-valued 
Aggregation and the law of motion for aggregate distributions
This subsection studies the question of aggregation of individual behavior to form aggregate behavior and derives the law of motion for the aggregate distributions induced by the sequences of individual optimal policy functions {g t+1 } t 0 and individual shocks (s i t ) t 0 . In perfectly competitive markets, each consumer has no influence over prices, and all consumers together determine prices. The continuum formulation and a suitable law of large numbers make this possible. To see this, recall that the aggregate distribution at date t, t ( , z t ), is defined in (8) . It is a random measure that depends on the state ( , z t ). In models without aggregate shocks (e.g., [2, 31] ), perfect competition implies that equilibrium aggregate distributions must be deterministic. The latter can be achieved by assuming a no aggregate uncertainty condition on the shock processes and the underlying probability spaces, introduced in [6, Definition 1] for models of anonymous sequential games. Feldman and Gilles' construction [13, Proposition 2] shows that this condition is not vacuous and their construction is applied directly by Miao [31] to a Bewley-style model without aggregate shocks.
Say that a process X = (X t ) t 0 , X t : I × → D, where D is a Euclidean space and X t is jointly measurable, satisfies no aggregate uncertainty if there exists a nonrandom measure such that (i ∈ I :
, for P-a.e. . 10 Note that whether or not a process X has the no aggregate uncertainty property depends on the underlying probability space. The implication of the no aggregate uncertainty condition is that (i ∈ I : X(i, ) ∈ D) = P ( ∈ : X(i, ) ∈ D) if each X i is drawn from the same distribution. In this case, the measure is in fact this common distribution. Thus, the empirical distribution of a sample of random variables (X i t ) i∈I is the same as the theoretical distribution from which all these random variables are drawn.
To accommodate the case where aggregate shocks are present, I follow [6] and introduce a notion of conditional no aggregate uncertainty. A process X = (X t ) t 0 , X t : I × × Z ∞ → D, satisfies the conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition if given the history of aggregate shocks z ∞ ∈ Z ∞ , X satisfies the no aggregate uncertainty condition. I now assume: Assumption 6. The individual shock process s i = (s i t ) t 0 , s t : I × × Z ∞ → S, satisfies the conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition relative to the probability space
This assumption implies that given the history z ∞ ,
where P z is the conditional measure on given z ∞ . Thus, conditional on the history of aggregate shocks z t , aggregate labor endowments satisfy
which is deterministic. This property, along with the labor market clearing condition (6), puts a restriction on aggregate labor supply N t ; namely, N t must depend on z t only. Assumption 6 permits derivation of the law of motion for aggregate distributions, as I now show. Because consumers are ex ante identical, they will choose the same optimal asset accumulation policy. Thus, given the individual state (a i t , s ti ), the history of aggregate shocks z t , and the sequence of aggregate distributions , let the asset holdings next period be a i t+1 = g t+1 (a i t , s ti , z t , ) for -a.e. i. Fixing a history of shocks z t+1 and using (8) and Bayes' Rule, one can derive that for any Borel sets A ∈ B(A), 
) × B (S).

The existence theorem
I now state one main result of the paper.
Theorem 1. Given Assumptions 1-6, there exists a sequential competitive equilibrium. Moreover, the set of equilibrium sequences of aggregate distributions are compact.
The idea of the proof can be described as follows. Consider a sequence of aggregate distributions = t (z t ) t 0 ∈ P ∞ (A × S) along a history of aggregate shocks z ∞ . Denote by P 0 ∞ (A × S) the set of all such sequences satisfying the labor market clearing condition A sequence of optimal asset accumulation policies {g t+1 } t 0 can be derived from Lemma 1.
Define a new sequence of aggregate distributions
for all Borel sets A ∈ B(A) and 
Lemma 3. P ∞ (A × S) is a compact and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space.
One can now apply the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff Fixed-Point Theorem to the map :
Any fixed point induces a competitive equilibrium.
Recursive characterization
To permit a recursive characterization of sequential competitive equilibria, I make two stationarity assumptions:
Assumption 7. Q t+1 (S × Z, s t , z t ) = Q(S × Z, s t , z t ) for all t 0 and S × Z ∈ B(S) × B(Z).
Assumption 8. Aggregate labor endowments at any date t 0 is given by a measurable function
Given these assumptions, the economy is the same as that studied by Krusell and Smith [24] . These two assumptions also imply that past histories of individual shocks do not affect current decisions. Thus, the aggregate distribution of asset holdings and individual shocks at date t, t , can be defined as
The set of all aggregate distributions is denoted by P ∞ (A × S) = × ∞ t=0 P(A × S) Z t . Under Assumptions 1-8, the pricing functions (4) and (5) become r : P(A×S)×Z → R, 
V (a , s , z , ( ) t+1 )Q(ds , dz , s t , z t ). (16)
This problem is studied in Lemma 4.
To derive a recursive characterization, it is important to select state variables. A current state must be a sufficient statistic for the future evolution of the system. With incomplete markets and heterogeneous consumers, equilibrium prices generally depend on the distribution of assets across the consumers. Thus, it is natural to include the aggregate distribution as a state variable. The question is whether it constitutes a sufficient endogenous aggregate state. To answer this question, I define a notion of equilibrium correspondence in the next subsection.
Equilibrium correspondence
I first provide a lemma characterizing an equilibrium sequence of aggregate distributions.
Lemma 4. Let Assumptions 1-8 hold. Then: (i) There is a unique continuous and bounded function
and a unique continuous policy function g :
16). (ii) Any equilibrium sequence of aggregate distributions ( t ) t 0 is characterized by the following equations: for t 0, A × B ∈ B(A) × B(S),
A×S s t (z t )(da, ds) = N(z t ),(17)t+1 (z t+1 )(A × B) = A×S 1 A (g(a t ,
s t , z t , ( ) t ))Q(B, z t+1 , s t , z t )
where 0 is given.
Eq. (17) is the labor market clearing condition. Eq. (18) says that the evolution of ( t ) t 0 must be consistent with consumers' optimal behavior. It embodies rational expectations.
I now define an equilibrium correspondence E :
, where E(z, ) is the set of equilibrium sequences of aggregate distributions associated with an initial aggregate state (z, ). Theorem 1 shows that E(z, ) is nonempty and compact so that the correspondence E is well defined. An important property of the equilibrium correspondence is described in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1-8, the equilibrium correspondence E is upper hemicontinuous.
Because the equilibrium correspondence is generally not single-valued, there may be multiple equilibrium trajectories that are consistent with a given initial aggregate distribution and a given initial value of aggregate shock. This implies that the current aggregate distribution is typically not a sufficient (endogenous) statistic for the future evolution of the aggregate distributions (or prices). This motivates the need for additional state variables.
Before I turn to recursive characterizations in the next subsection, I define another correspondence. Let
Define a correspondence :
Thus, the correspondence assigns to any point (z, , v) ∈ X the set of equilibrium sequences of aggregate distributions with the property that the expected payoff to consumer i is v(a, s, z, ) when the initial state is
. Since E(z, ) is nonempty by Theorem 1, the correspondence is well defined. Using Lemma 5, one can establish the following lemma, which is important for the recursive characterization studied in the next subsection.
Lemma 6. Under Assumptions 1-8, the correspondence is upper hemicontinuous.
Recursive equilibria
I now turn to recursive characterization of sequential competitive equilibria. The key to recursive characterization is the selection of state variables. Inspired by the literature on sequential games [5, 7, 11] , and on dynamic contracts [1, 32, 36] , I include the expected payoffs (expected discounted utilities) as an additional endogenous state variable and define a recursive equilibrium as follows. ((f, T v , G), (r, w) ) consists of a measurable policy function f :
Definition 2. A recursive (competitive) equilibrium
and measurable pricing functions r : P(A × S) × Z → R and w : P(A × S) × Z → R + such that:
(i) Given the pricing functions r and w, the policy function f solves the following problem
where v ∈ C(A × S × Z × P(A × S)) and
(ii) The firm maximizes profits so that r and w satisfy (14) and (15).
(iii) The sequence of aggregate distributions induced by G is such that labor markets clear: A×S s t (da, ds) = N(z t ), ∀z t ∈ Z t , where t+1 = G(z t , t , v t , z t+1 ) and 0 is given.
(iv) The law of motion for aggregate distributions G is generated by the individual optimal policy f , i.e., for all A × B ∈ B (A) × B(S) , (f (a, s, z, , v))Q(B, z , s, z) (da, ds) . Q(B, z , s, z) does not depend on z so that G does not depend on z . In this case, = G(z, , v) . Note that requirement (iv) embodies rational expectations. It is justified by the analysis in Section 3.2 and Lemmas 2 and 4.
The following theorem shows that given an initial state, a recursive equilibrium generates a sequential competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1-8 hold. Given the initial state ((a i
0 , s i 0 ) i∈I , z 0 , 0 , v 0 ), a
recursive equilibrium ((f, T v , G), r, w) generates a sequential competitive equilibrium (((a i t+1 , c i t ) t 0 ) i∈I , (r t , w t ) t 0 ) in which consumer i's expected discounted utilities are given by
The dynamics of the sequential competitive equilibrium (((a i t+1 , c i t ) t 0 ) i∈I , (r t , w t ) t 0 ) is described as follows. 
. Then the date 1 prices are given by r 1 = r ( 1 , z 1 ) and w 1 = w( 1 , z 1 ). Under these prices, consumer i accumulates
and consumes the remaining wealth c i
The state then moves to date 2, and so on. Finally, the expected payoff to consumer i in the equilibrium (((a i t+1 , c i t ) t 0 ) i∈I , (r t , w t ) t 0 ) is given by v 0 (a i 0 , s i 0 , z 0 , 0 ). Does a recursive equilibrium defined earlier exist? Can any sequential competitive equilibrium be generated by such a recursive equilibrium? The following theorem answers these questions.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1-8, there exists a recursive equilibrium. Moreover, for any competitive equilibrium (((a i
t+1 , c i t ) t 0 ) i∈I , (r t , w t ) t 0 ) with the sequence of aggregate distributions * , there exists a payoff equivalent competitive equilibrium that is generated by a recursive equilibrium.
This theorem implies that a recursive equilibrium exists. Moreover, any payoff implied by a sequential competitive equilibrium can be generated by a recursive equilibrium. Notice that the sequential competitive equilibrium generated by the recursive equilibrium may be different from the equilibrium (((a i t+1 , c i t ) t 0 ) i∈I ,(r t , w t ) t 0 ). But they imply the same expected discounted utilities.
The key to the proof of the theorem is to construct an equilibrium sequence of aggregate distributions = ( t ) t 0 such that its law of motion satisfies (iv) in Definition 2. This is achieved by taking a measurable selection from the correspondence . Then t+1 is obtained as the second component of (z t , t , v t ) . The payoff v t+1 (a t+1 , s t+1 , z t+1 , t+1 ) is obtained as the continuation utility at date t +1, V (a t+1 , s t+1 , z t+1 , (z t , t , v t ) ), implied by the equilibrium sequence of aggregate distributions (z t , t , v t ) when the economy starts at date t. This reflects rational expectations formed at the previous date. Moreover, v t+1 serves as a device to select the 'continuation' equilibrium (z t+1 , t+1 , v t+1 ) when the economy starts at date t + 1. Finally, since the dynamics of the constructed equilibrium is stationary, the maps (f, T v , G) can be constructed so that a recursive equilibrium is obtained.
Turn to another recursive characterization proposed by Krusell and Smith [24] , which assumes that the aggregate distribution does constitute a sufficient endogenous (aggregate) state.
Definition 3. A KS-recursive (competitive) equilibrium ((v, h, H ), (r, w)) consists of a value function
, and measurable pricing functions r : P(A × S) × Z → R and w : P(A × S) × Z → R + such that:
(i) Given the function H and the pricing functions r and w, v and h solve the problem:
subject to = H ( , z, z ).
(iii) The sequence of aggregate distributions induced by H is such that labor markets clear:
A×S s t (da, ds) = N(z t ), ∀z t ∈ Z t , where t+1 = H ( t , z t , z t+1 ) and 0 is given.
(iv) The law of motion for aggregate distributions H is generated by the individual optimal policy h, i.e., for all A × B ∈ B(A) × B(S), (h(a, s, z, ) )Q(B, z , s, z) (da, ds). (21) It is straightforward to show that a KS-recursive equilibrium generates a sequential competitive equilibrium. Does a KS-recursive equilibrium exist? For a related finitely many agents economy, Kubler and Schmedders [25, Theorem 2] establish the existence of such a recursive equilibrium under the strong condition that the competitive equilibrium is globally unique for all possible initial values. Although one can state a similar result for the economies studied here, this strong condition cannot be checked from primitives. It is an open question whether a KS-recursive equilibrium exists without this condition.
11
Conclusion
In this paper, I describe the Bewley-style model with aggregate shocks in terms of sequences of aggregate distributions. Using this formulation, I resolve two central open questions. Specifically, I establish the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium and provide a recursive characterization of sequential competitive equilibria. There are still some open questions remaining. For example, how to design efficient numerical methods to solve Bewley models with aggregate shocks? Does there exist a recursive equilibrium defined in [24] ? I leave these questions for future research. 
Finally, I show that is continuous. Fix a history of aggregate shocks z ∞ . Let the sequence of aggregate shocks n → (n → ∞), n , ∈ P ∞ (A × S). Let = ( ), n = ( n ), and n = 
Let the pricing functions r : P(A × S) × Z → R and w : P(A × S) × Z → R + be defined as in (14) and (15 Since (( t ) t 0 ) n ∈ E(z n , n ), it follows from Lemma 4 that of aggregate distributions * , there exists another payoff equivalent sequential competitive equilibrium, that is generated by the recursive equilibrium.
Step 1: By Lemma 4, there exist continuous functions V and g solving the dynamic programming problem (16) . By Theorem 1, a sequential competitive equilibrium exists. Thus the correspondence defined in (19) is well defined. Since it is upper hemicontinuous by Lemma 6, it follows from [18] that there exists a measurable selection from . I use to construct a recursive equilibrium with the expanded state space.
Define the pricing functions (r, w) as in (14) and ( 
T v (z, , v)(a , s , z , )Q(ds , dz , s, z).
This verifies part (i) in Definition 2.
Step 
